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Overview 
In the summer of 1991, the California Department of Corrections' (CDC) 
institutionalized population reached 10 1 ,65 8 in cells and dormitories that the 
CDC says are meant to hold 54,042. It is a prison system whose numbers 
dwarf any other in the country, including the federal Bureau of Prisons. 
This flood of inmates has more than quadrupled California's prison popula-
tion in little more than a decade. A large number of these inmates serve less 
than a year. In 1990, there were 25,13 8 inmates in the category of those 
committed to California's prisons by the courts who were released within a 
year. In addition, another 3 7,197 inmates were in the category of those who 
had been recommitted for parole violations and were released before they had 
served 12 months. Because these offenders serve such short terms, they 
receive virtually no rehabilitative programming, particularly education or 
drug treatment. 
To house the increased numbers of inmates, CDC instituted the largest prison 
building program in the history of the world about 10 years ago. At the same 
time, the Department developed a revised, sophisticated classification system 
designed to ensure that convicts are housed in facilities which reflect the level 
of security needed to incarcerate and control them safely. The classification 
system was also designed to determine future construction requirements. 
Currently, however, the CDC's classification system has evolved so that many 
inmates who could be safely housed in minimum security facilities are 
assigned to much more expensive, higher security facilities. 
The unmanageable numbers of short-term offenders have made it difficult for 
the CDC to provide services for significant segments of its prison inmates. 
CDC parole services to reintegrate inmates into the general population have 
also been resoundingly ineffective. California returned 39,976 parolees to 
custody in 1989, nearly as many parolees as the other 49 states combined for 
that year. 
This report will show how California's prison operations can become more 
cost effective in light of the increased prison population and the phenomenon 
of short-term offenders. It will trace the issues of overcrowding and the 
conflict within CDC over determining appropriate security placement and 
rehabilitative programming for the inmate population. 
The first part of the report provides an historical review of CDC penological 
philosophy. Beginning nearly 140 years ago, it includes a discussion of the 
creation of the classification system for prisoners and how it has impacted 
population management, as well as the conflict between punishment and 
rehabilitation. 
1 
The second part of the report is a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of 
the state inmate population, including what offenses resulted in commitment. 
It deals with the increasingly split character of the prison system, a pheno-
menon in which increasing numbers of short-term offenders are being incar-
cerated, while at the same time large numbers of other offenders are receiving 
longer sentences from the courts. 
The third part deals with issues in the management of the prison population, 
including the application of a revised classification system which accompa-
nied the new building program. The report will also analyze the degree to 
which overclassified inmates have driven up the cost of CDC's construction 
program. It will discuss inadequacies in the educational, vocational and drug 
treatment programs. 
The final section provides policy recommendations to match CDC's inmate 
population more closely with security levels and to provide inmates with tools 






the California , 
Prison System 1 
The first decades of prison life 
in California were accompan-
ied by astonishing brutality. 
Floggings were common. 
Overcrowding was the norm. 
In 1852, when San Quentin Prison opened its doors to 250 men, "the public 
feeling was for the extermination of criminals and, failing that, herding them 
into prison for the longest possible term." 1 
The felons the execution 
of those guilty of is a attitude which, more years than 
not, has characterized the California prison system. Indeed, until the election 
of Governor Warren in 1942, the design concept for the state's penal 
institutions was to make them grim and forbidding. A California prison 
historian wrote that "the predominance of a plain, somber interpretation of 
Gothic (architecture) for use as prison facade resulted from early prison 
designers' intention to terrify the prisoners rather than from an aesthetic 
sensibility." The historian quotes one building committee which ordained that 
"the exterior of a solitary prison should exhibit as much as possible great 
strength and convey to the mind a cheerless blank indicative of the misery 
which awaits the unhappy being who enters its walls."2 
The first decades of prison life in California were accompanied by astonishing 
brutality.3 Floggings were common. Overcrowding was the norm. In 1854, 
lM. Estell, who operated San Quentin on a contract basis with the State of 
California, wrote a letter to the California Legislature in which he complained 
that "it was not contemplated that there would be more than 50 prisoners at 
any one time in the prison for several years. Instead, we have as of this date 
over 300,, on hand, not counting 112 who have escaped and never been 
recaptured. "4 
At the same time, privatization was tried in a particularly unsatisfactory form. 
Early in the state's history the California Legislature ordered that prisoners be 
leased to private contractors like Estell, who provided food, clothing, housing 
and custody in return for labor. That was supplanted, however, by a contract 
system under which the state retained responsibility for the care and custody 
of prisoners but sold their labor to private contractors.5 San Quentin Prison 
still features a building used for the manufacture of window sashes and blinds 
by one contractor. (The sash and blind building was the original site of San 
Quentin's death row. It contained the prison's scaffold.) But the contract 
system was notoriously corrupt. One early contractor at San Quentin refused 
to use prisoners under his employ to build prison buildings for their own 
housing, as called for by his contract with the state. Instead, he forced the 
inmates to work in the manufacture of farm implements for his own enter-
prise.6 In 1879, California's Constitution was changed to prohibit contracting 
convict labor.? 
Punishment for any infraction was solitary confinement on bread and water in 
a stone cell devoid of any furnishings except a mattress, which was removed 
during daylight hours. Ventilation holes in the iron door were covered by a 
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This conflict of philosophies 
has continued the 
state's as the pendulum 
has swung between punish-
ment and rehabilitation 
metal hood, resulting in absolute darkness and isolation. Those who broke 
rules were often placed in a kind of prison strait jacket This involved stripping 
the inmate for torture. 
Guards 
through 
minutes, the inmate's hands and 
cut off. Sometimes victims were left for 
were permanently crippled by this device. 8 
There were those who disagreed with such brutality and who believed con-
victs should be treated more humanely. This conflict philosophies has 
continued throughout the state's history, as the pendulum swung between 
punishment and rehabilitation. Driven by a scandal over the harshness of 
prison conditions, a Joint Legislative Committee investigating conditions at 
San Quentin as early as 185 7 recommended segregation and classification 
prisoners to separate younger, more tractable individuals from hardened 
criminals. 9 
That was the first such recommendation to classify inmates, but it would 
hardly be the last. In fact, questions over classification of prisoners, in varying 
degrees, have dogged the system through to the present time. The question of 
classification of inmates by level of behavior, amount of time to serve, escape 
potential and other factors is important. Classification serves not just to 
segfegate inmates by susceptibility to criminal behavior but also to provide a 
basis by which inmates can be placed in programs to aid in their rehabilitation. 
Today, classification is also a vital tool in determining the kinds of prisons that 
the California Department of Corrections (CDC) should construct, since the 
level of classification of prisoners determines the level of facilities that are 
needed. 
In addition to classification and segregation of prisoners, the Joint Legislative 
Committee in 185 8 recommended giving prisoners uniforms for warmth, 
eliminating inhumane punishment, acquiring books and allowing them to 
observe Sabbath days. 10 Some of the recommendations were implemented 
for instance, uniforms were issued - and conditions did improve. 
A so-called "good time" law was passed in 1864, allowing for reduction in 
total sentences for good behavior. 11 (In 1880, the good time law would be 
modified to give inmates credit of two months off the total sentence for the 
first two years of good behavior, four months off for each of the next two 
years, and five months off for each subsequent year until release.) 12 
In 1862, a legislative committee on state prison conditions issued a report 
recommending a building policy at San Quentin that would take into consid-
eration classification of prisoners. 13 By the 1870s, a group of reformers, called 
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From the the state 
system seemed to func-
tion with little The 
only classification that 
occurred was race and 
the "New Penologists," also recommended the classification and segregation 
of prisoners by age and susceptibility to criminal behavior. As a result of the 
legislative committee's report and the reformers' efforts, such a classification 
policy became a prison it would be discovered decades 
later San Quentin nor implemented the policy. From the 
beginning, the state prison system seemed to function with little oversight. 
The only classification that occurred was by race and sex. 14 
Original plans to make Folsom a reform-oriented facility rather than a 
traditional hard-labor prison were dropped. The prison site was selected in the 
1870s partly because it was considered an excellent location for quarrying 
rock. Inmates were subjected to rigorous hard labor. They were punished for 
various infractions not only with the straitjacket, but also with a device called 
the "Oregon boot," whereby a prisoner's foot was encased in metal plates that 
could be compressed by turnscrews. A so-called "water cure" was also used. 
The naked victim was tied with arms outstretched and blasted with a high 
pressure hose. If he opened his mouth to protest, the guard directed water into 
his mouth until he lost consciousness. 15 
In the 1880s, the reform movement began emphasizing education, vocational 
training and self discipline. The California Legislature passed a rudimentary 
parole law in 18 89. 16 But despite public support for these reforms, little was 
done in the prisons themselves. In 1903, the California State Assembly 
authorized a standing Committee on the Prisons to investigate conditions, 
which the Committee found to be shocking. The Committee discovered that 
most cells held four or five prisoners, that there was no system to segregate 
first-time offenders from hardened criminals, and that, in practice, there was 
still no classification system to provide a professional assessment of the 
degree of an inmate's continuing commitment to crime. The Committee's 
report concluded that San Quentin and Folsom were "schools of vice and 
universities of crime."17 The Committee recommended building a separate 
unit to house insane prisoners at Folsom, while the rest of the prison housed 
the most violent recalcitrant criminals. The Committee further recommended 
protecting younger inmates by keeping them at San Quentin, away from the 
hard-line inmates at Folsom. 18 These recommendations were ignored, as 
previous recommendations had been. 
The idea that prison work had redemptive value for inmates began to take 
hold at the turn of the century - that those who had lived idle and dissolute 
lives should learn the work ethic, and that they also should pay for their own 
support by the state while in prison.19 
The reform movement lasted through World War I. During the early twen-
tieth century, an enhanced classification system for probation and parole was 
created by the California Legislature to supplement the original1889law, so 
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that some offenders could be kept out of the prison system entirely, and others 
could be released early. But escapes and public distrust, among other prob-
lems, made authorities cautious. In the 17 years after the 1889law, only 223 
of 720 men eligible for parole were given an release.20 
San Quentin and were swollen with overcrowded inmates, 
generally without classification or segregation, until1918, when Folsom was 
officially made the state's prison for recidivists. Nonetheless, progress was 
made.2 1 In the same year, the California Legislature passed a progressive 
indeterminate sentencing law, eliminating mandatory sentences and giving 
wardens some discretion in releasing However, 
parole was used sparingly until the 1930s due to public outcry against 
releasing prisoners. 
Some felt sentence would generate fairness in length of stay 
because prison authorities could use their judgment to release some offenders 
after having served more realistic terms than those imposed by judges, who 
meted out vastly different sentences on individuals who had committed the 
same crimes. But, while many prison reformers thought the indeterminate 
sentence would result in shorter sentences, in some jurisdictions the result was 
just the opposite.22 
The 1930s represented the beginning of a to the rehabilitative 
philosophies that dominated California penology through the next four 
decades. Reformers began to have increasing success in arguing for parole 
reforms that the Penologists had demanded as long ago as the 1870s. 
The opening in 1940 of a new low security industrial California 
Institute for Men at Chino, was an example. Reformers had been arguing 
since the 1860s for the separation younger prisoners from older, more 
intractable, vicious inmates. was opened under that philosophy. 
In California as almost everywhere else, prison was characterized by over-
crowding. But during the two decades following W odd War II, the situation 
began to change. Overcrowding and implementation rehabilitation pro-
were made easier by a dramatic drop prison populations during the 
In 1934, California's two institutions for men Quentin and 
one an industrial farm at Tehachapi, had a 
combined of more than 9 ,300, or 150 prisoners per 100,000 
population. That fell to about 117 per 100,000 1940. the close of 
World War II there were only 5,700 adult about 63 per 100,000,23 
in comparison to the current rate 311 100,000.24 
Nonetheless, Richard A. McGee, was appointed by then-Governor Earl 
Warren 1943 to head the prison system, found that prisons were under-
staffed, ahd that San Quentin and Folsom in particular were governed by a 
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Overcrowding, idleness, poorly 
trained and poorly managed 
staff, and the neglect of human 
needs in areas of health and 
spiritual stimulation were the 
primary factors that prevented 
prisons from working properly. 
system of convict bosses who rewarded their allies and punished their ene-
mies. His prescriptions for rehabilitation were relatively simple. Overcrowd-
ing, idleness, poorly trained and poorly managed staff, and the neglect of 
human needs in areas of health and spiritual stimulation were the primary 
factors that prevented prisons from working properly, McGee asserted.25 
According to McGee, American prison administrators "have been engaged in 
a losing battle to create productive employment opportunities for men and 
women serving time in prison." He stressed the need to "provide constructive 
occupation for prisoners" as an antidote to prisoner unrest and a public 
perception of prisons as institutions where inmates did nothing and came out 
unregenerate. Under Governor Warren and with McGee heading the prison 
system, a structure "was created through which to interpret and effect peno-
logical thinking."26 Since the system began, according to a prison historian, 
"there was a perceived need to separate prisoners from each other and to 
classify them according to their predicted ability to return to society as 
functioning citizens." By the mid-1940s, the historian wrote, "the California 
prison system was set on a new course of integrating criminals into the larger 
society." New prisons at Soledad, Chino and Vacaville were all created with 
these goals in mind.27 
By the mid-1950s, a classification system functioning under the so-called 
clinical study method was well in place. When inmates entered reception 
centers, they met with a counselor who acted as a diagnostician. The counse-
lor attempted, using experience and intuition, to assess how much of a 
behavior problem each new inmate would pose, and how much security 
would be needed to house him. The California Institute for Women, built at 
Tehachapi in 1936, had a similar reception center to handle women prisoners. 
Older male recidivists were sent to Folsom, and more amenable inmates and 
first-termers were sent to San Quentin and Chino. Chino was built as a 
minimum security prison on the theory that these less criminally-inclined 
inmates would be better off associating with their peers and not the toughest 
of criminal offenders. 28 
But Chino illustrated the problems of the clinical study classification system. 
Authorities at San Quentin and Folsom were reluctant to send promising 
inmates from their reception centers to Chino. They did not want to lose 
inmates to another prison who were conforming, manageable and capable of 
doing work outside prison walls. 29 
The rehabilitation movement's theories of prison management, emphasizing 
the rehabilitative value of work and education, held sway well past the time 
when McGee retired in 1967 from the cabinet-level position of Secretary of 
the Youth and Adult Corrections Agency, to which he had been appointed by 
Governor Edmund G. Brown. By 1972, according to the National Council on 
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Crime and Delinquency, prison authorities in nearly every state, the District of 
Columbia and the federal government used indeterminate sentencing to 
which was considered 
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The previous system had been 
heavily weighted toward over-
classifying inmates into higher 
security levels than their 
behavior warranted . . n more 
sophisticated classification sys-
tem was necessary so the 
Department could 
construction needs to house the 
The previous system had been heavily weighted toward overclassifying 
inmates into higher security levels than their behavior warranted. That was 
because counselors used a subjective system of classification by observations, 
which what statisticians call "false positives." Counselors tended to 
far more individuals than as escape risks or behavior 
problems, to prevent the possibility that any would walk away from minimum 
or stage violent incidents. 
addition, as the federal court emphasized in Palmigiano v. Garrahy, a nore 
sophisticated classification system was necessary so the Department could 
predicate construction needs to house the projected prison population. The 
California Legislature demanded that the Department develop such a system. 
In 1979, the Department, aided by a federal grant, began formulation of a new 
objective points-based classification system. The system was used to create a 
score for each inmate that then would be converted into four general classifi-
cation designations (Level I through Level IV) corresponding to the levels of 
security required. Level I was designated for inmates with the lowest scores, 
and thus the least probability for antisocial behavior. Level IV was designated 
for those who were the most dangerous. 34 
In the meantime, rehabilitation as a penological philosophy in the California 
Legislature had lost support. In 1977, the California Legislature rewrote the 
Penal Code to exclude all reference to rehabilitation, instead saying it "finds 
and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment."35 
The CDC correctional philosophy, however, continued to reflect a need for 
rehabilitation in its mission statement,36 as follows: 
1. Incarcerating California's most serious criminal offenders m a 
secure, safe and disciplined institutional setting. 
2. Providing work, academic education, vocational training and spe-
cialized treatment for California's inmate population. 
3. Providing parole services including supervision, surveillance and 
specialized services with the aim of parolee reintegration into the 
community and continuing some of the educational, training and 
counseling programs that were initiated during the institutional 
stay. 
4. Searching for improved correctional strategies (institutional and 
parole) that could enhance the protection of the public through 
cooperative efforts with criminal justice system agencies and other 
agencies. 
5. Providing public education on the role of correctional 
programming. 
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Despite the emphasis in the CDC mission statement on work, academic 
education, vocational training and specialized treatment, the penological 
philosophy that had governed the California prison system since the mid-
1940s began to wane. In recent years, California Department of Corrections 
as evidenced by the that it is building classrooms and other 
rehabilitative facilities at a far slower pace than it builds beds - reflects the 
statutory intent to a greater degree program mission statement 
8 
A Descriptive 






... the CDC forecasts that. . 
institutions will be at 218 per-
cent of design bed capacity ... 
CDC projected the institu-
tional population to exceed ... 
209,643 by the year 2000. 
In 1980 at the beginning of the surge in California's prison population, 
California Department of Corrections (CDC) housed 24,569 inmates in 
dormitories and cells that the Department were designed for 23,5 
the 1980 prison population was at l 04 percent of design bed capacity, 
as defined by the Department.37 Today, the prison population stands at 
177 percent of design bed capacity.38* 
In an attempt to deal with this influx of prisoners, and faced with the deteriora-
tion of existing prisons, CDC in 1980 initiated a massive New Prison Con-
struction and Renovation Program, that ultimately would make the Depart-
ment the largest in terms of numbers of employees. 39 By mid-1991, the system 
included 2 7 prisons, 10 reception centers, 41 work camps and 60 community 
corrections facilities, such as return-to-custody units or halfway houses. Nine 
more prisons are in varying stages of design, construction or activation.4o 
These facilities are spread across the length and breadth of California, from 
Crescent City (the home of Pelican Bay, the state's most secure prison) to the 
Richard J. Donovan facility, which is located 10 minutes from the Mexican 
border. The oldest prison in the system, established in 1852, is San Quentin. 
San Quentin, Soledad and Old Folsom are tiered prisons with as many as five 
floors of cells patrolled by rifle-bearing officers on catwalks. The latest prison 
to be opened, which builders hope to replicate not only across California but 
throughout the U.S. and other countries as well, is at Wasco. Wasco, like other 
new state prisons, is a high-tech facility where officers at electronic consoles 
move inmates in and out by touching buttons to control their cell doors. 
Including completion of the Department's goal of building 25,000 more 
prison beds by 1996, the CDC forecasts that, without changes in the variables 
on which they base their forecasts, institutions will be at 218 percent of design 
bed capacity, using the Department's definition of "capacity."41 In April 
1991, CDC projected the institutional population to exceed 163,000 in 1996 
and 209,643 by the year 2000.42** Even if the building program were to 
continue at an accelerated pace throughout the 1990s, there will likely be an 
overcrowding problem well above 200 percent ofthe Department's definition 
*It is importanrto note that the Departmellf 's polity is to al/emptlo house one inmate in each ceil, despite thefact that 
most of the cells hui/tj(Jr higher security inmates contain two built-in bunks. As of June 16. 1991, CDC's institUlionalized 
populmion reached !01,658 in cells and dormitories meant for 54,042. 43 Thus. despite the biggest prison building 
program in the history of !he world. the California prison system is more overcrowded today !lum it was a decade ago. 
within the context of the Departmem's definilion bed capacirr. 
**on September I, 1991, CDC said !hal those predictions have been scaled down infight of an unexpecred decline in 
new in males this year over the previous year. CDC attrihu!ed the decline to a recent sharp drop in arrests for drug 
offenses. CDC Director James H. Gomez warned, however, thai the number of convicts in stale prisons would continue to 
increase by more than 5,000 annually even if the previous rate of in male population growth is halved. Top Corrections 
adminislrators indicated thatlhey will not revise their population projections until later in J 99 f. 
9 
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of design bed capacity by the end of the decade. Thus, even when the CDC 
builds prison beds very rapidly, it falls further behind. To operate at what 
CDC officials consider an "acceptable" level of overcrowding, which is 
120 percent of design bed capacity for dormitory beds and 130 percent 
design bed capacity ,300 new prison be required at an 
additional construction cost of $8.2 billion the end of the century.44 
This single-minded mission prison construction raises three issues: 
1. CDC's current building program, from its inception, has been at 
odds with the characteristics of the inmate population. Since initia-
tion in 1980 of the New Prison Construction and Renovation 
gram, the Department has emphasized the construction of high-cost 
individual cells. However, the prison population throughout much 
of the 1980s increasingly included short-term inmates who could be 
safely housed in dormitory-style quarters at 72 percent of the cost 
for individual cells. 
2. The focus on housing and the safe holding of inmates has been at the 
expense of providing viable work, educational, vocational training 
or specialized treatment programs for California's inmate popula-
tion. CDC's construction program is dictated by an institutional 
design capacity that insures the complete control of inmates by a 
rapidly growing correctional officer staff. In light of the nature and 
types of inmates residing in CDC institutions - a high percentage 
of short- term, drug or property offender and parole violators - it is 
incumbent on CDC to focus on more than just a building program to 
house predominantly long-term inmates. 
3. CDC may be holding to an outmoded cell occupancy policy that 
results in inefficient use of space. As overcrowding has increased, 
and inmates have increasingly been double-celled, the incidence of 
violence, both against officers and inmates, has steadily decreased. 
The state's new prisons are so secure that it would be cheaper to 
adhere to a standard of double-bunking for Levels III and IV 
inmates, except for the least controllable. 
Each of these issues will be explored more fully in this report. First, it is 
important to understand the characteristics of the current CDC inmate 
population. 
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.. as of June 16, 1991, CDC 
had jurisdiction over 193,793 
adult felons and a 
population equal to a city the 
size of Fremont or Huntington 
Beach. 
There are twice as many 
minority inmates as whites in 
the institutionalized popula-
tion, an incarceration rate well 
beyond their representation in 
the general population. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CDC INMATE POPULATION 
or 
an imprisoned city 
committed for non-violent than violent 
commitments are released after a year or 
system, 95,705 were in prisons or camps, and 5 were community-
based facilities. Another 403 were in state hospitals administered by 
Department of Mental Health. 
Much of the rest of the population under CDC control is comprised of 7 4,65 0 
parolees. Some 69,405 are felons, on the street, reporting to parole officers, 
while an additional 2,922 are civil narcotic outpatients in drug programs. 
The remaining 2,323 are parolees from other states being supervised in 
California. 
Additionally, 4,330 parolees are supervised by other state, federal or juvenile 
jurisdictions, including 2,771 in non-CDC confinement and 1,559 supervised 
by other jurisdictions.4s 
Finally, another 13,155 inmates are out to court, escapees or parolees who 
have not reported to parole agents. 
There are two different time analyses by which the CDC examines the 
institutional population. One analysis occurs on December 31st of each year 
and examines various characteristics of the total institutional population on 
that date. The other type of time analysis examines characteristics of the 
twelve-month flow of inmates received and released during a calendar year. 
The calendar year analysis is used to predict the trend of future population. 
Total Institutional Population 
Racial and Ethnic Characteristics. There are twice as many minority inmates 
as whites in the institutionalized population, an incarceration rate well beyond 
their representation in the general population. On December 31, 1990, out of 
the total institutional population of97,329, 29.8 percent(28,951) were white, 
compared with their representation of 57.2 percent of the state's total popula-
tion, while blacks were 35.5 percent (34,535) of the prison population, yet 
only 7.0 percent of the general population was black. Those of Hispanic origin 
made up 30.0 percent (29,212) ofthe prison population and 25.9 percent of 
the general population. Asians and other races or peoples of ethnic origin were 
4.7 percent (4,631) of the prison population and 9.9 percent of the general 
population.46 
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... significantly more inmates 
(59% v. 41%) were committed 
for non-violent offenses ... as 
violent offenses. 
Type of Commitment and Release. The type of commitment distinguishes 
inmates by status and committing authority. On December 31, 1990, the 
CDC total institutional population of 97,329 consisted of:47 
• 6 l ,357 (63.0%) new admissions from Superior Court. A new admission 
have had a prior commitment to CDC, but was not on parole at the 
time of committing offense. new admission can be a result of a felony 
conviction or a civil narcotic commitment - where criminal proceed-
ings are suspended while the defendant undergoes treatment at the 
California Rehabilitation Center as a narcotic addict. 
• 21,12 7 (21. 7%) parole violators who returned with new terms from 
court. These are parolees who have violated their terms of parole by 
committing a new crime and have been returned to prison with new 
commitments from court. 
• 13,108 (13.5%) parole violators returned to custody. These are parolees 
who have violated conditions of parole and have been ordered by the 
Board of Prison Terms to return to prison. The maximum term for which 
a parole violator may be returned to prison by the Board of Prison Terms 
is one year. 
• 996 (1.0%) outpatient returns to the California Rehabilitation Center 
(CRC). These are narcotic addicts who have violated the conditions of 
parole and have been ordered by the Board of Prison Terms to return to 
CRC. 
• 7 41 (0.8%) others, including escapees and psychiatric returns. 
Committing Offense. As of December 31, 1990, within the total CDC 
institutional population, significantly more inmates (59% v. 41 %) were 
committed for non-violent offenses (property, drug, DUI offenses) as 
violent offenses. As illustrated by Table 1, since 1984, as a percentage 
of the total prison population, inmates committed for violent offenses 
have significantly declined and inmates committed for property 
offenses have declined, while inmates committed for drug offenses have 
dramatically increased and inmates committed for other offenses have 
increased. 
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Table 1 ·INMATES BY COMMITTING OFFENSE 
for Total Institutional Population 
Table 2 





, Other Offenses 1,453 3.4 
SUBTOTAL 42,360 100.0% 
Missing Data 674 
TOTALS 43,034 










Time in Prison Since Admission. As Table 2 shows, on December 31, 1990, 
10.1 percent of the CDC inmate population (excluding parole violators 
returned to custody by the Board of Prison Terms [PV-RTCs]) had been 
incarcerated for five years or longer, as compared to 4.7 percent in 1982. As a 
result of the increase in the number of inmates currently incarcerated for five 
years or longer, despite the increased number of short-term new commit-
ments, the mean time prison for all new commitments currently incarcer-
ated increased, from 1.6 years in 1982 to 1.9 years, where it has remained 
s·oce 1988. 
TIME IN PRISON SINCE ADMISSION FOR MALE FELON PRISON 
POPULATION3 
for Total Institutional Population 
Years Ending 1982, 1985, 1988, and 1990 
DECEMBER 31, 1982 DECEMBER 31, 1985 DECEMBER 3!, 1988 DECEMBER 31, 1990 
TIME IN PRISON NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT 
Less than I yr. !5,281 49.7% 20,406 50.0% 30.195 51.6% 41,442 54.5% 
I thru I. 9 vrs. 7988 26.0 8 987 22.0 II 817 20.2 14139 18.6 
2 thru 4.9 yrs. 6,0!5 19.6 8,802 21.6 10.963 18.7 12,758 16.8 
5 yrs. or Longer 1.429 4.7 2,616 6.4 5,526 9.5 7.665 10.1 
TOTAl~'> 30,713 100.0% 40,8H 58,501 lOO.Oo/o 76,004 160.0% 
MEAN Ui yrs l.7yrs l.9 yrs. 1.9 yrs. 
Source: CDC Offender Information Services. 
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Calendar Year Institutional Population 
Inmates Received and Released. As an illustration of the fluidity of this prison 
population, during Calendar Year 1990, CDC received 
inmates number those rP>r•a.nTJ:: ... n 
47,692 (45.2%), were parole returned to prison the Board of 
Prison Terms. The second largest group was felon new admissions court, 
37.2 percent of those received (39,272 inmates). The third largest group, 
14,070 inmates (13.3%), was parole violators with new terms. An additional 
2,276 (2.2%) individuals were sent to CDC by the courts under a statutory 
provision to determine whether they should be sentenced to prison, probation 
or jaiL The final group, 158 inmates (2.1 %), was first-time civil narcotic 
admissions. 
Virtually all the inmates dL :::barged in 1990 from CDC were released to 
parole. Of the 86,600 felon inmates released from CDC institutions, 42,101 
(48.6%) were released for the first time to parole, while 39,596 (45.7%) were 
parolees returned to custody and subsequently re-released to parole. Others 
released were 2,230 (2.6%) county diagnostic cases discharged from CDC 
institutions, and 2,551 (3.0%) civil narcotics addicts who were released to 
parole outpatient status. Some 122 (0.1 %) inmates who died in CDC institu-
tions were also counted as released.48 
Committing Offense. As Table 3 shows, a review of the committing offenses 
of the felon new admissions and the parole violators with new terms admitted 
to CDC during the CY 1990 reflects even more starkly that increasingly more 
inmates are committed to state prison for non-violent offenses. In addition, 
according to the Board of Prison Terms, virtually 80 percent ofPV-RTCs are 
returned to custody for non-violent offenses. 
Table 3 COMMITTING OFFENSE CATEGORIES FELONY NEW 
ADMISSIONS FROM COURTa 
for Calendar Year 1990 
NEW ADMISSIONS PV-RTCs 
OFFENSE NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT 
Violent Offenses 12,529 23.5% 9,039 19.0% 
Prooertv Offenses 17 335 32.5 13 215 27.7 
DruJZ: Offenses 18 238 34.2 7 867 16.5 
Other Offenses 5,231 9.8 9,117 19.1 
Technical Violations NIA NIA 8,454 17.7 
SUBTOTAL 53,333 100.0% 47,692 100.0% 
Missing Data 9 0 
TOTALS 53,342 47,692 
aincludes parole violators with new terms (PV-WNTs) and parole violators returned to 
custody (PV-RTCs). 
Source: CDC Offender Information Services, and Board of Prison Terms. 
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No single societal development has contributed more to the overcrowding of 
California prisons than the emergence of the drug culture and growing 
penalties enacted to attempt to control it. The drug offender commitment rate 
took another big jump last year. During 1990, of the 53,342 new admissions 
from court received by CDC, 34.2 percent were convicted of drug offenses, a 
staggering leap from the 17.6 percent committed 1985. By contrast, only 
23.5 percent of new admissions in 1990 were for violent offenses, compared 
1985, when 39.2 percent of the admissions were for violent offenses.49 
Length of Stay. One of the most unique shifts in CDC's prison profile is the 
phenomenon of increasingly longer term commitments for some inmates 
coupled with a surge in number of inmates with short-term commitments. 
The CDC institutional population is simultaneously being pulled into two 
different length-of-stay directions. 
Table 4 shows that CY 1990, 56.6 percent all new commitment 
inmates (new admissions from court plus parole violators with new terms) 
first released to parole in 1990, served 12 months or less in prison, and that 
35.8 percent spent nine months or less in prison. though parole violators 
with new terms already are on parole, they are considered first releases 
because they have been committed by the courts for a new crime.) Parole 
violators returned to custody by definition may only be returned to prison for a 
maximum of one year. As Table 4 indicates, in 1990, nearly half of all 
parolees- 48.8 percent - spent only three months or less in prison. Some 
25,138 new commitments spent 12 months or less state prison, while 
15,900 spent nine months or less. In addition, 31,270 parole violators returned 
to custody spent six months or less in state prison. 
Table 4 1 FELONS FIRST RELEASED TO PAROLE 
by Months Served in CDC Onlya 
for Calendar Year 1990 
NEW COMMITMENTS 
LENGTH OF STAY NUMBER PERCENT 
3 months or less 1,312 3.0% 
6 months or less 6405 14.4 
9 months or less 15,900 35.8 
12 months or less 25 138 56.6 




31 270 82.3 
34,476 90.7 
37 197 97.9 
37,998b 100.0% 
a Releases to only. Does not reflect offenders who have not become eligible 
for release. 
bparole violators returned to custody (PV-RTCs) may 
maximum of one year. 
Source: CDC Offender Information Services. 
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be recommitted to CDC for a 
While experiencing this signif-
icant influx of short-tenn 
commitments, CDC is simul-
taneously experiencing an 
increase in the number of indi-
viduals sentenced for longer 
periods of time. 
REASONS FOR RAPID GROWTH OF PRISON POPULATION 
There are many reasons given for the recent rapid growth of the short-term 
population. to 
• effective 1, 1983, which that aU residential 
burglaries be punished as first degree burglary. In the past, first offenders 
would probably have been sentenced to jail or probation. 
• The increase in the average pre-prison confinement time credit received 
by CDC inmates. The amount of pre-confinement time served in local 
jail is credited against an inmate's sentence when he/she is admitted to 
prison. The average pre-prison confinement time credit received by 
CDC inmates was 7.9 months in 1988, which was nearly double the 
pre-prison confinemer.~ credit of 4 months in 1978. 
• Legislation, which generally is more punitive than in the past, mandates 
sentencing many offenders to prison for more types of crimes. Ten years 
ago, many of these offenders would have received probation or jail with 
probation. 
• Severe overcrowding oflocaljails removing them as a short-term pun-
ishment option for felony offenders. 
• Lack of a range of available state or community punishment options 
other than overcrowded jails and prisons for short-term felony offenders. 
While experiencing this significant influx of short-term commitments, CDC 
is simultaneously experiencing an increase in the number of individuals 
sentenced for longer periods of time. Legislation has created lengthened and 
enhanced sentences for many crimes and the extenuating circumstances 
surrounding the commission of such crimes. 
Of all inmates currently incarcerated in state prisons, 57 percent were com-
mitted for drug, property or other non-violent crimes.* Many of these types of 
inmates serve their sentences in county jails, or facilities that cost far less than 
prisons.50 But because few state or local intermediate punishment options 
exist, judges are left with few options other than to sentence felony offenders 
to probation or prison. Twenty-three counties in the state in mid-1991 were 
operating under court orders to keep their jail populations down. The court 
orders in these counties affect jails that hold nearly 80 percent of the jail 
*These include property offenses plus drug offenses plus "other" nonvwlent offenses. Although arson is included in the 
"other" offense category, it must be subtracted from the total because it is considered a vwlent offense. 
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Also contributing heavily to 
as well as 
ma s is a special cate-
gory of inmate which has 
exploded on the scene over the 
past decade the undocu-
mented whose commit-
offense is subject to depor-
tation oro(:eeam 
population in the state, in every major population area. 5 1 These overcrowded 
jails have increasingly forced local authorities to demand that CDC quickly 
remove its parole violators and new commitments from local institutions. 
They are often on a bus for state prison in as few as eight hours. 52 Judges report 
they are sentencing greater numbers of offenders to state because 
there is no room for them in local short-term 
offenders to prison has become the most secure confinement available 
to local judges. 53 
two months for an inmate to be processed into 
system, it is if not impossible, to these short-term inmates 
through any program. 
primarily California's most serious offenders has, been 
subverted because ofthe impact of short-term inmates are unable to take 
part in rehabilitative programs.s4 
THE PHENOMENON OF UNDOCUMENTED CRIMINAL ALIENS IN 
CALIFORNIA PRISONS 
Also contributing heavily to prison overcrowding, as well as to the fiscal 
on California's budget, is a special category of inmate which has exploded on 
the scene over the past decade - the undocumented alien, whose committing 
offense is subject to deportation proceedings. 55 Like their fellow short-term 
inmates from local and the drug they place a great strain on the 
p ·•son system. officials estimate that criminal aliens 
may comprise as much as 20 percent prisoners) of 
California's population.* The of undocumented crimi-
aliens has as they have served as "mules" or drug couriers into 
the U.S. or have been caught up in the California drug scene after they 
immigrate They are convicted of felonies and drug and 
weapons offenses, and face deportation when their sentences have been 
served. As of May 1991, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) had put a "hold" for eventual deportation on more than 9,600 CDC 
inmates from 100 countries, about 6,700 of Mexican nationals.56 
It is further estimated between 30 and 40 percent of some criminal court 
dockets, 30 percent of the jail population, 20 percent of 
probation and parole caseloads are made up the undocumented criminal 
alien population category. than 60 percent of felony offenses, for 
which these undocumented criminal aliens are convicted, are drug or 
drug-related. 57 
*CDC does not have exact figures for the number of undocumented criminal aliens incarcerated in Califomi£1 prisons. 
CDC only tracks aliens who are held for INS deportation procedures. However, CDC officmls estimate that there may be 
over 10,000 more undocumented criminal aliens witltin the CDC popuwtion who may be subject to future U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service proceedings. 
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Significantly reducing the ~tate 
and local institutional criminal 
alien population would posi-
tively impact the entire judicial 
system. 
In recent legislation, the U.S. Congress expressed concern and instructed the 
INS to give greater attention to the identification and removal of criminal 
aliens from federal, state and local jurisdictions. federal Immigration and 
1 deportation nrr''"'"""""' 
their 
required law enforcement 
officials to notify when they on drug charges, any individual 
suspected of being an undocumented criminal alien. 59 
The federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 provides for expedited formal 
deportation hearings for aliens who are convicted of aggravated felonies-
murder and drug and weapons trafficking. The 1988 Act added the require-
ment for the U.S. Attorney General to provide for special deportation proceed-
ings to be held at federal, state and local correctional facilities for criminal 
aliens. Pursuant to federal ( irectives, proceedings are to be initiated and, if 
possible, completed before these aliens finish serving their sentences.6o 
CDC and INS entered into an agreement, effective in September of 1987, to 
provide for an Institutional Hearing Program whereby federal immigration 
judges hold deportation hearings for criminal aliens while still incarcerated in 
state prison.61 Currently, a limited number of deportation hearings are occur-
ring at one CDC institution, the Robert J. Donovan Correctional Facility in 
San Diego. Undocumented criminal aliens, who are issued final orders of 
deportation, are transferred to INS custody upon the normal completion of 
their state sentence. 
Significantly reducing the state and local institutional criminal alien popula-
tion would positively impact the entire judicial system. Insuring that criminal 
aliens are quickly and correctly identified and provided with formal deporta-
tion hearings, while institutionalized, would result in the prompt issuance of 
orders of deportation, thus, facilitating the entire deportation process. 
Removing criminal aliens from state and local custody to federal custody after 
issuance of a final deportation order and prior to the termination of state 
prison or local jail sentences could save substantial state and local correc-
tional resources. Such action would necessitate cooperation from the federal 
Bureau of Prisons, possibly through legislation, to provide for 
federal of aliens deportation until they have 
completed their sentences. 
Additionally, should criminal aliens return to this illegally, a 
violation of the deportation order would be a federal offense, carrying a 
possible five-year sentence. The federal government would have jurisdiction 
for purposes of investigation, prosecution, trial, sentencing and imprisonment 
of those who return illegally to this country. As a direct result, the state 
criminal court caseloads and state and local correctional populations would 










Although CDC claims that the 
adminiscrative determinants 
are necessary for a complete 
classification of inmates, such 
subjective determinants can 
serve as a convenient method 
to override the points-based 
classification system, often 
resulting in the inmate's 
placement into a higher secur-
ity setting than warranted. 
THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
Prior to the decision to proceed with the California Department of Correc-
tions' (CDC) massive building program, there were no formal objective 
inmate classification guidelines in the California prison system. From the 
mid-1950s, incoming inmates were evaluated and classified by committees 
and staff specialists who relied primarily on experience and subjective judg-
ment. In 1980, however, partly due to legislative concerns that it would be 
difficult to establish a prison building program without knowing the charac-
teristics of the projected inmate population, CDC instituted what would 
become, with modifications, the current classification system. It was among 
the first such classification systems in the United States.63 
All newly committed offenders and parole violators returned to custody are 
sent to a CDC reception center, where the initial classification process may 
take 30 to 90 days. However, an inmate may be subject to reclassification 
throughout the institutional stay. The classification system rates the inmate 
primarily for security risk. Facilities are also organized in accordance with a 
similar security ranking system. The goal of classification is to place inmates 
within the proper security level in prisons. The inmate is classified on a 
points-based system involving 38 factors, including criminal history, length of 
sentence, behavior during prior terms, escape history, age at time of commit-
ment and other factors.64 
Apart from this points-based classification system, CDC has administrative 
determinants, that can override the inmate's score. Many ofthese administra-
tive determinants, including such factors as sex problems, time to serve, 
escape risk, known enemies and protective custody needs, are already cap-
tured by the points-based classification system itself. 
Although CDC claims that the administrative determinants are necessary for a 
complete classification of inmates, such subjective determinants can serve as a 
convenient method to override the points-based classification system, often 
resulting in the inmate's placement into a higher security setting than war-
ranted.65 Thus, the subjective administrative determinant process can act to 
override the objective points-based classification system and render it moot 
The inmate's score places him within a four-level security system (the lower 
the level, the lower the security risk): 
Level I inmates: 0-18 points, are non-violent offenders, generally with less 
than 30 months to serve; 
Level II inmates: 19-27 points, may have prior offenses but "little history of 
institutional violence or escapes;" 
Level HI inmates: 28-51 points, have received long sentences and have several 
prior prison terms or "significant behavior problems;" and 
Level IV inmates: 52 points and over, have a "long history of crime or 
violence and generally are escape risks." 
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Interestingly, all Levels III and 
IV cells, except administrative 
segregation units and SHUs, 
are designed and built for dou-
ble occupancy although the 
Department's ideal - despite 
current forecasts of long-range 
overcrowding - is 120 per-
cent of design bed capacity in 
Level I and II dormitories, and 
130 percent of design bed 
capacity in Level III and IV 
cells. 
inmates are assigned to facilities built with security features that are intended 
to correspond with the level of security classification the inmate has been 
assigned.66 
This four-level security is at 
institutions contain facilities which enable them to 
security levels. Other institutions may built primarily to one security 
level. The facility rank depends upon its structure, security devices and 





Inmates are housed in open dormitories without a secure 
perimeter. 
Inmates are housed in open dormitories but the facilities 
have fenced perimeters and armed coverage. 
Facilities have individual cells, fenced perimeters, elec-
tronic security and armed coverage. Within some Level III 
facilities are special administrative segregation units 
which are used as short-term placements for Level III 
behavioral problem inmates. 
In addition to cells and fenced or walled perimeters, max-
imum security facilities include electronic security, and 
more staff and armed officers than at a Level III facility. 
Within some Level IV facilities are Special Housing Units 
(SHU) which represent the highest degree security for 
inmates whose institutional behavior or security risk, 
irrespective of classification level, cannot otherwise be 
controlled. 
INSTITUTIONAL BEDS DO NOT MATCH INMATE HOUSING NEEDS 
CDC defines design bed capacity as: "The maximum number of inmates a 
facility was originally designed to house."68 For Levels I and II inmates living 
in dormitories, this means one inmate per bed in areas designated as living 
quarters. Overcapacity for Levels I and II inmates would mean that areas not 
originally designed to contain beds (e.g., gymnasiums, warehouses, 
classrooms and halls) now house Levels I and II inmates. Design bed capacity 
for Levels III and IV inmates is predicated on one inmate per celL Overcapac-
ity means that CDC assigns two inmates to a single cell. Interestingly, all 
Levels III and IV cells, except administrative segregation units and SHUs, are 
designed and built for double occupancy although the Department's ideal-
despite current forecasts of long-range overcrowding - is 120 percent of 
design bed capacity in Level I and II dormitories, and 130 percent of design 
bed capacity in Level III and IV cells. Stated simply, 130 percent of design bed 
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capacity means that 30 percent ofthe cells would contain two inmates, and 
70 percent would house only one, although most of the cells are built with 
two beds.69 
If the classification system were a reliable predictor of inmate security needs, 
inmates classified as "Level I" would be housed in Level I institutions or beds, 
Level II inmates in Level II institutions and so forth for each classification 
level. However, in practice there is a significant divergence between this 
classification of inmates and their actual placement in a particular institu-
tional security level. The cost implications of this "out-of-level" placement 
practice are staggering. If the CDC altered its prison construction program 
over the next five years to conform with the projected security classification 
levels of inmates, the state could save hundreds of millions of dollars. 
The following tables demonstrate the capital and operational cost .... ,J .. '-'" 
tions of building facilities to match inmate security classification levels and of 
adopting double-ceUing as CDC policy. 
Table 5 shows the distribution of the male felon population by classification 
score and institutional placement in May 1991. For example, of the 20,117 
inmates housed in Level I beds, only 14,738 are classified as Level I inmates. 
Of the 25,052 inmates classified as Level I, only 14,738, or 59 percent, are 
living in Level I facilities. Those actually living in facilities appropriate to their 
classification in Levels II, III and IV were 58 percent, 89 percent and 82 percent 
respectively. Although out-of-level placements occur for every classification 
group, these percentages indicate a bias toward placement of inmates 
security settings higher than their classification scores suggest. As demon-
strated by Table 5, 3,669 inmates classified as Level I security risks are housed 
in facilities built to contain Level HI inmates, and 298 Level I security risks are 
housed in Level IV facilities. Similarly, 3,877 Level II inmates are housed in 
Level III facilities, and 1 Level II inmates are housed in Level IV facilities. 
DISTRIBUTION OF MALE FELON POPULATION 




INSTITUTIONAL I Special Med/ w/o 
PLACEMENT I II HI IV Security Psych Score TOTALS 
Level I 14.738 3 143 289 16 0 0 I 931 20117 
Level II 6347 10050 522 47 0 0 2 250 19 216 
Level III 3 669 3 877 14 797 l 791 70 2 671 3 028 29,903 
Level IV 298 175 996 8 590 I 983 0 910 12 952 
Reception 10971 a 
TOTALS 25,052 17,245 16,604 10,444 2,053 2,671 8,119 93,159 a 
a Reception has been reduced to just a total because of the large number of inmates w/o a score; therefore, row 
TOTAL does not equal column TOTAL 
Source: Report #CLA-2 CDC Offender Information Services, June 18, !99 L 
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Table 6 uses the CDC's 1991 inmate classification data from Table 5 and 
· extrapolates that data to June 30, 1996. This is currently the furthest point in 
time that the Department has made population projections pursuant to its 
1991-96 Facilities Table 6 shows 1 of 42,650 
inmates expected to be housed Level I beds, as 
Level I inmates. Ofthe 49,142 inmates classified as Level I, only 31,246 will 
be housed in Level I facilities. The remainder of those classified Level I will be 
living at higher levels of security. Table 6 row totals (horizontal) are 
Department's gross population projections which form the basis for the 
CDC's current five-year prison construction program. The Department's 
projection of bed needs uses all out-of-level placements, and is not based on 
actual classification needs. The Assembly Office of Research (AOR) applied 
the percentage of out-of-level classifications derived from Table 5 to the 
Department's 1996 population projections. 
Table 6 EXTRAPOLATED DISTRIBUTION OF MALE FELON POPULATION 
by Classification Score and Institutional Placement 
June 30, 1996 
.iNSTITUTIONAL 
PLACEMENT I II III 
Level I 31,246 6663 613 
Level II 12,774 20226 1,050 
Level ma 4807 5 079 19,385 
Level IVa 315 185 l 052 
Reception 




Special Med/ w/o 
IV Security Psych Score 
34 0 0 4094 
95 0 0 4 528 
2 346 92 3,499 3 967 
9,069 2 093 0 961 










aRight hand column population totals are based on CDC Spring 1991 Population Projections, Table 6, last line. 
Levels III and IV population numbers were derived from Table 6 as follows: 
Level III= IUs+ Med/Psych + PHU (32,520 + 6,495 + 160 = 39,175) 
Level IV= !Vs +SHU (11,375 + 2,300 = 13,675) 
bReception has been reduced to just a total because of the large number of inmates w/o a score; therefore, row 
TOTAL does not equal column TOTAL. 
Source: CDC Five-Year Facilities Master Plan, 1991-96. 
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Table 7 I POPULATION, DESIGN BED CAPACITY, AND OCCUPANCY RATE 
by Security Level for Department and Classification-based Projections 
June 30, 1996 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CLASSIFICATION-
DEPARTMENT OCCUPANCY BASED OCCUPANCY 
PROJECTIONS DBC3 RATE(%) PROJECTIONSb DBC3 RATE(%) 
Level I 42 650 12 932 329.8% 53 236 12 932 411.7% 
Level II 38 673 16734 231.1 36 681 16734 219.2 
Level III 39 175 20537 !90.8 29 566 20537 144.0 
Level IV 13 675 
'!i= 150.2 14 690 9 104 161.4 Receotion 18 695 11089 168.6 18 695 II 089 168.6 TOTALS 152,868 70,396 217.2% 152,686 70,396 217.2% 
1 3 Design Bed Capacity (DBC) numbers derive from Five-Year Facilities Master Plan, 1991-96. DBC for Levels Ill and IV were 
calculated to be consistent with population components as follows: 
Level III Ills (including Med) + Psych ( 17,634 + 2,903 20,537) 
LevellY !Vs +SHU (7,024 + 2,080 ~ 9,104) 
bCiassification-based population numbers are adjusted column totals fromm Table 6 and were determined as follows: 
Levell Is+ Is wlo score (49,142 + 4,094 53,236) 
l.evelll !Is+ lis w/o score (32,153 + 4,528 36,681) 
Level lll Ills+ Ills wlo score+ Med/Psych (22,1 00 + 3,967 + 3,499 ~ 29,566) 
Level IV~ !Vs + !Vs w!o score+ Special Security (11,544 + 961 + 2,185 14,690) 
Reception 18,695 per Spring 1991 projections 
Source: CDC Five-Year Facilities Master Plan, 199 I -96, and CDC Spring !991 Population Projections, 1990-96. 
Table 7, columns 1-3, compares the CDC's projected occupancy rate (popu-
lation divided by design bed capacity), with a projection based solely on 
inmate classification, columns 4-6. The design bed capacity includes all 
existing and currently authorized new prison construction projects and mis-
sion changes, and excludes contract community beds. Given the divergence 
between needs based on the CDC's projected inmate classification and the 
Department's projection of bed placement needs, the prison construction 
program has been, and continues to be, skewed toward building higher 
security, i.e., predominantly Level III beds, while neglecting Level I bed needs. 
The Department's projected Level IV inmate population is nearly comparable 
to Level IV bed needs. 
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Table 8 TOTAL BED NEEDS BEYOND EXISTING AND AUTHORIZED 
DESIGN BED CAPACITY (DBC) FOR 1996 POPULATION 
by Security Level for Department and Classification~based Projections 
June 30, 1996 
(1) I (2) I (3) (4) (5) I (6) BED NEEDS I REMAINING BED NEEDS I BASED ON BASED ON I REMAININ I G 
DEPARTMENT BED"'EEDSa CLASSIFICATION I BED NEEDS 
I 
PROJECTIONS DBC (col.l-col.2) SCORE DBC (co1.4-col.5) 
Level I 35,542 12,932 22,610 44,363 12,932 31,431 
Level II 32,228 16,734 15,494 30,568 16,734 13,834 
Level Ill 30,135 20,537 9,598 22,742 20.537 2.205 
Level IV 10,519 9,104 I ,415 1!,300 9,104 2.196 
Reception 14,381 11,089 3.292 14,381 11,089 3.292 
TOTALS 122 805 70 396 I 52 409 123 354 70 396 52 958 
(7) (8) (9) 
COST 
DIFFERENCE AVERAGE DIH'ERE"'CE 
IN BED NEEDS COST (col. 7 x col.8) 
(col.6-col.3) PER BED{$) (million$) 
Level I + 8.821 $ 63,095 + $556.56 
Level II 1,660 96,500 160.!9 
Level Ill - 7,393 110.600 . 817.67 
Level IV + 781 I! 1,666 + 87.21 
Reception 0 1!0,600 0.00 
TOTALS + 549 -$ 334.09 
a Level l bed need calculation based on Department Projections: 
(Level l population divided by Level l Manageable Overcrowding Rate) Existing and Authorized Design Bed 
Capacity [(42.650 divided by 12) -12,932 22,6101 
Source: CDC Five-Year Facilities Master Plan, !991-96" 
Table 8 calculates additional bed needs in two ways. In columns 1-3 are the 
needs based on Department projections contained in the CDC's 1991-96 
Facilities Master Plan for facility construction. In columns 4-6 are the bed 
needs for 1996 based on inmate classification scores extrapolated from 
current ( 1991) figures. Bed needs are calculated by dividing the population 
for each security level by the appropriate "manageable overcrowding rate" 
(MOR), and then subtracting existing and authorized design bed capacity. 
Manageable overcrowding rate is a concept developed by the Department 
that recognizes that some degree of overcrowding is manageable, depending 
on the type of inmates housed, capacity of the physical plant and program 
availability. For inmates housed in cells (Levels III and IV), the Department 
plans for a manageable overcrowding rate of 130 percent, while inmates 
housed in dormitories (Levels I and II) can be overcrowded at 120 percent. 
For maximum security and inpatient psychiatric inmates, no overcrowding is 
permitted by the Department. 
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Table 9 
Because new cells (as well as 
supporting infrastructure such 
as offsite utilities) built by the 
Department for Levels III and 
IV inmates can accommodate 
double occupancy, double-
ceiling should be adopted as 
CDC policy to maximize the 
use of available bed capacity 
and reduce costs. 
Columns 7-9 demonstrate that the prison building program is skewed toward 
construction of higher level facilities than the classification system warrants. 
A projection of bed needs based on classification rather than the Department's 
projections would require 8,821 more Level I beds and 781 more Level IV 
beds, but 1 ,660 fewer Level II beds and III beds. Overall, 
because of the cost differential construction beds at different security 
levels, the classification-based approach would result in a savings of more 
than $334 million at projected 1996 costs per bed. 
TOTAL BED NEEDS BEYOND EXISTING AND AUTHORIZED 
DESIGN BED CAPACITY (DBC) BASED ON CLASSIFICIATION 
SCORE AND HIGHER OCCUPANCY AT LEVELS HI AND IV 
June 30, 1996 
(!) (2) (3) (4) I 
DIFFERENCE WI 
DEPARTMENTAL 
BED NEEI>S BEDl'IEEDS 
BASEUON REMAINING ASSESSMENT 
CLASSIFICA TJON BED NEEDS ( col.3-col.3 
SCORE lJBC (col.!-col.2) of Table 8) 
Level l 44 363 12.932 31 431 + 8 82 i 
Level II 30 568 16 734 13 834 I 660 
Level lila 16.532 20.537 4 005 13 603 
Level lVb X,437 9,104 667 , 2.082 
Reception 1-U81 11,089 3.292 0 
TOTALS 114,281 70,396 43,885 . 8,524 
"Level Ill bed need, were determined'" follow>: 
Level Ill population "9.566 26Jl67 Ills+ 3,499 :vlediPsych 
Beds for lib at 200'# MOR ~ 13.033 
Reds for Med; Psych at I 00'/r MOR 
16.532 Total 
IV bed needs were detennined as I(JJlow" 
Level IV population 14.690 ~ 12.505 IVs + 2,185 Special Security 
Beds for IVs at 200'k MOR 6.252 
Beds for Special Security at I 00'/r MOR ~ • 85 
8,437 Total 




AVERAGE COST (col.4 x col.5) 
PER BElJ($) (million$) 
$ 63 095 + $ 556.56 
96500 !60.19 




Because new cells (as well as supporting infrastructure such as offsite utilities) 
built by the Department for Levels III and IV inmates can accommodate 
double occupancy, double-celling should be adopted as CDC policy to maxim-
ize the use of available bed capacity and reduce costs. Table 9 projects 
increasing the manageable overcrowding rate from 130 percent to 200 percent 
for all Levels III and IV cells except for medical, psychiatric and special 
security units, which comprise 17 percent of these two levels. Immediate 
adoption of a classification-based prison construction policy coupled with 
double-ceiling rates for Levels III and IV inmates would save more than 
$1.3 billion in capital costs by 1996, based on projected costs per bed in 1996. 
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Table 10 
... AOR recommendations 
on double-ceiling and classi-
fication propose 35,003 beds 
at a cost slightly more than 
$2.62 billion, for a savings of 
$1.55 billion in General Fund 
Capitol Outlay. 
Statistics concerning escapes and violent incidents support the idea that 
double-celling is practical. Since the inception of California's new prison 
building program 1980, both show a steady downward trend. The escape 
rate has fallen to its lowest rate since W odd War II. The rate of violent 
incidents has dropped from 11.69 per 100 daily population in 1982 to 
6.5 per 100 in 1989. During those years, prison overcrowding went from 
104 percent of design bed capacity in 1980 to 177 percent in 1991. 
COMPARISON OF FACILITIES MASTER PLAN BUILDING 
PROGRAM WITH CLASSIFICATION-BASED PROGRAM 
June 30, 1996 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FACILITIES 
(5) 
MASTERPLAN cosr' CLASSIFICATION- cosr' COST DIFFERENCE 
1991-96 (million$) BASED PROGRAM (million$) (million$) 
Level lb 15 200 $ 959.04 22 550 $1 422.79 +$ 463.75 
Level II 15 300 I 476.45 12 453c I 201.71 . 274.74 
Level lii 9,800 1,253.38 0 0.00 1,253.38 
Level IV 1,680 187.60 0 0.00 - 187.60 
Reception 3,300 299.78 oc 0.00 
-
299.78 
TOTALS 45,280 $4,176.25 35,003 $2,624.50 • $1,551.75 
aBased on projected cost per bed in 1996 per CDC Five-Year Facilities Master Plan, 1991-96, p. 2-31 (Table F), number of beds 
from pp. 2-30 and 2-31 (Tables E and Fl Level III Ills+ Psych beds to be constructed. 
'.sin the Master Plan, the assumption is made here that 8,88 t contract community beds will be in use, thereby reducing Level I bed 
needs (31 ,431 - 8,881 - 22,550). 
cThe 4,672 surplus of Levels III and IV beds completely eliminates building needs forthe reception population of3,292 and l ,380 of 
the Level II bed needs. 
Source: CDC Five-Year Facilities Master Plan, 1991-96. 
Table 10 compares the prison building program proposed in the Department's 
1991-96 Facilities Master Plan with a modified building program based on 
inmate classification and double-ceiling for Levels III and IV inmates, except 
medical, psychiatric and special housing units. Additional savings accrue 
because of the surplus of Levels III and IV beds (already authorized and 
funded) which can accommodate Level II inmates and those in "reception" 
status. The Department's Master Plan calls for construction of 45,280 beds 
(not including those for women) at a cost of more than $4.17 billion, while 
AOR recommendations on double-celling and classification propose 35,003 
beds at a cost slightly more than $2.62 billion, for a savings of $1.55 billion in 
General Fund Capital Outlay. 
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The classification-based 
. results in the 
need for 409 fewer correc-
tional officers 
. . the annual 
savings amount 
$21.7 million . . 
Table 11 
Construction costs are not the only item affected by the skewing of inmate 
population demographics toward higher security placements. Annual operat-
costs are affected as that more staff are 
to 1 
fewer correctional 
a current average annual cost $53 including 
71 the annual operating cost savings amount to more than 
$21.7 million in current dollars. 
STAFF NEEDS 
Department v. Classification-based Projections 
June 30, 1996 
(!) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
STAFF NEED s 
DEPARTMENT CLASSIFICATION- DIFFERENCE 
PROJECTIONS STAFF NEEDS" BASED PROJECTIONS STAFF NEEDS3 ( col.4-co1.2) 
Level I 42 650 11.847 53 236 14 788 + 2 941 
Level II 38 673 10 742 36681 10 189 553 
Level !II 39,!75 13,058 29,566 9.855 3,203 
Level IV 13,675 5,470 !4,690 5,876 + 406 
TOTALSb 134,173 4l,tl7 134,173 40,708 409 
aStaff needs based on inmate to staff ratios, as supplied by CDC Administrative Services Division. Level! is 3.6: I, Level il is 3.6: I, 
Level Ill is 3.0:1, and LevellY 2.5:1. 
bReception is not included because population counts are the same under both projection methods and, therefore. would not produce 
a difference in staff needs. 
Source: CDC Five- Year Facilities Master Plan, 1991-96, and CDC Administrative Ser1ices Division. 
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Corrections 
substance abuse treatment, 
work programs have suffered 
as a result of the need to house 
the 
PRISON PROGRAMS: A DECADE OF NEGLECT 
Prison administrators consider inmate idleness and boredom among the 
biggest to the efficient The California 
as water delivery 
and vocational""'...,'""'"" programs as Prison Industries Authority 
at 100 percent of ~-v·.., .. bed capacity.72 
McKinsey wrote in a statement prepared for a 1987 Administrative Planning 
Session on Department-wide problem areas:73 
There is not adequate available physical plant space in existing 
institutions or in the newly designed/opened institutions to 
accommodate necessary inmate programming activities when 
the inmate overcrowding population approximates 190 per-
cent, nor there adequate physical plant space or support 
services space for the staff who are required and hired to 
support the services to inmates institution staff needs 
when inmate populations approaches 190 percent. 
While the Department has attempted to ease this and some progress 
has been made in providing educational facilities, it remains at the very heart 
CDC's problems. James H. Gomez, Director of CDC, contends that the 
system design is adequate if programs were operated on double shifts, but he 
does not have sufficient budget resources to double-shift programs 
the prison system.74 
Many criminal justice experts, including Shannon Reffet, Executive Direc-
tor of the Robert Presley Institute Corrections Research and Training at 
the University California, Irvine, and James O'Malley, formerly of the 
CDC, are convinced that the most effective substance abuse treatment pro-
grams are comprehensive educational and job training programs.75 It is 
difficult to provide educational or vocational programs for those 
spending fewer than six months in prison, and virtually impossible for those 
spending fewer than three months. Prison officials at Folsom Prison acknowl-
edge that, for many inmates, there is a waiting period as long as two years to 





able level of program would be 
6 percent of the inmate population eligible for assignment. Thus, an "'"'"'v'.,. 
number without assignment should be 3,000 to 6,000 77 
As of January 1991, of the 94, 13 3 inmates then in prison, 9,65 2 were on 
waiting lists for inmate work/training assignments. Another l 0,683 without 
assignments were in Reception Centers, and an additional 4, ll 0 were in 
orientation.78 However, these 14,793 inmates normally would be unable to 
participate in rehabilitation or work programs because they have not yet 
received permanent living assignments. 
In the best of all possible worlds, the inmates incarcerated for a short period of 
time in state prisons should be placed in community-level beds. However, 
until a major community corrections building program is initiated, these 
short-term inmates must remain in the prison system. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that they will be there long enough to receive program assignments, 
either for work or education, two major program areas that have especially 
suffered. 
Educational and Vocational Programs 
In CDC's 1987 evaluation of Departmental problem areas, it was stated that 
"existing policies, practices and attitudes regarding educational assignments 
have resulted in unacceptable levels of school assignments/attendance lead-
ing to underutilization of education resources and low inmate academic and 
vocational achievement."79 Little has changed in the intervening three and a 
half years despite costs which, according to Department's fig-
ures, average $5, 160 per student for primary I secondary academic education 
for 12 months of full-time instruction.80 That compares with an average of 
about $4,000 for nine months of instruction in California's public schools. 111 
California's approximately 100,000 
............ ..,,"""' education programs, and were enrolled 
All ofthe institutions have waiting for one or more 
Average times on waiting lists vary greatly. officials that 
in some prisons inmates must wait as long as two years to access to any 
program educational, vocational or work.82 
Some 56.4 percent of all inmates read below the ninth grade which is the 
nationally accepted standard for literacy. According to the Department, 
level for all males in the prison system is Grade and females 
83 However, the sample not tell the 
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huge group that cannot read at all," according to James O'Malley, former 
Deputy Director ofthe CDC Education and Inmate Programs Unit, who calls 
a better education system an "investment aspect." He also says:84 
hours of substance odds are great 
that they will forget that the are outside gates. 
we can teach them to read, you can that they won't 
forget. With some kinds of programming, it has to be done over 
and over and over. But if we can teach them to read, or teach 
them math, they won't forget. The best you can hope for, if 
inmates are addicted, is to try educate them out of it. 
Correctional officers say much of the current prison educational program 
consists of merely going through the motions. 85 S. Shannon Reffet and others 
agree. It is not unusual to walk through prison schools, Reffet says, and find 
inmates reading newspapers, visiting with each other and indulging in other 
activity unconnected with learning.86 
Drug Treatment Programs 
Drug treatment for inmates in California prisons is inadequate. Nearly 
80 percent of inmates have a substance abuse history, and perhaps as 
many as 70 percent were under the influence of an illegal drug, other 
than marijuana, at the time of arrest. 
It is estimated that only about 15 percent of prisoners with substance abuse 
problems receive any kind of drug treatment in the federal and state correc-
tional systems nationwide, according to Robert Aukerman, Vice President for 
Drug Abuse Issues and Chairperson of the Criminal Justice System for the 
National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors. In his 
testimony before the U.S. Congressional House Select Committee on Narcot-
ics Abuse and Control in May 1990, Aukerman called that figure inade-
quate.87 On a percentage basis, the nationwide average of 15 percent is five 
times more than the number receiving treatment in the California prison 
system, where only 3 percent of inmates receive intensive drug treatment.88 
In April 1991, the California Auditor General found that the Department had 
not performed nearly half of 38 tasks necessary to get a drug abuse treatment 
program established in California prisons. In the Department's report to the 
California Legislature, Substance Abuse Treatment and Education Services 
for Inmates and Parolees, December 1989, the CDC had scheduled to begin 
performing these tasks by January 1, 1991. On that date, however, the Depart-
ment had not yet created programs to assess inmate and parolee substance 
abuse treatment and educational needs, the most basic of these tasks. Without a 
needs assessment program, the Department is unable even to determine which 
inmates need the substance abuse program it is charged with creating. 
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Although Department officials argued to the Auditor General that some of the 
tasks were not completed because of lack of funds,89 some of the most basic 
tasks, such as the needs assessment, could have been accomplished without 
major funding. 
CDC responds that it has "taken steps to identify inmates who are eligible 
for substance abuse treatment programs" and has drafted an administra-
tive bulletin that is undergoing final review and should be effective by 
September 1991. One program for inmates at the RJ. Donovan Correc-
tional Facility in San Diego has been activated to handle 200 inmates. 
Initially, the Department says, the program got off to a slow start because 
inmates were reluctant to volunteer for an unknown program that required 
involvement, in addition to their current institution work or educational 
assignments. Now, however, there is a waiting list of inmates wishing to 
enroll in the program.9o 
In addition, community-based programs to keep inmates out of the system 
have not been effective. The Substance Abuse Revocation Diversion 
(SARD) program created by the California Legislature in 1988, and funded 
with $5 .5 million, was particularly unsuccessful and since has been discarded 
at the request of the CDC Director.9 1 The program, operated through parole 
agents, involved what the Department described as intensive supervision of 
parolees in an attempt to ensure that they stayed away from drugs. The 
Department has pledged to use the funds for other community-based pro-
grams. Critics of the SARD program, however, say it was unsuccessful because 
Department officials did not implement a truly intensive supervision model.92 
The Department acknowledged to the Auditor General in April 1991 that 
it had not begun to evaluate a variety of programs to help inmates 
"enhance life skills necessary for success after release on parole." These 
programs included creation of a parole services network to help parolees 
released in the Bay Area, a 12-step community services program for 
recovering addicts that is based on literature developed by Alcoholics 
Anonymous, and pre-release education programs involving "release 
skills," employability and substance abuse. Steps necessary to increase 
community-based services and referrals by parole agents, and include 
assessing and monitoring each participant's progress also were not imple-
mented. The Department's explanation for failure to implement several of 
these programs was lack offunding.93 However, as SARD demonstrates, it 
is not merely a question of resources, but rather the Department's inability 
to implement such programs effectively. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The taxpayer would be more effectively served if California could return its 
prison system to its historic Short-term out of the 
prison system and criminal 
aliens should be dealt their deportation 
to their native lands. Those inmates left should be properly classified and 
housed in accordance with security risk, and then placed in more effective 
educational, work and drug programs to keep them from repeatedly coming 
back to prison (recidivism). 
It is difficult enough to attempt to rehabilitate incarcerated felony offenders 
under any circumstances. Richard McGee pointed out in 1981 that if one adds 
to this:94 
... special conditions of enforced confinement, limitations of 
personal choices of food, clothing, companions, physical 
mobility and occupation, absence of normal sex life, limited 
recreational opportunities and a high concentration of social 
deviants, all over a period ofmany months or years, one has the 
recipe for producing not Jaw-abiding citizens but human 
anomalies. That 50 percent or more of them, to the best of our 
knowledge, do not come back is more astonishing than that 





More than a decade ago, CDC 
iDWUi~U the 
m1w·,mu program in the 
of the world. At the same time, 
a revised, 
classification sys-
""·'"'""" to determine 
and 
ments ... the classification sys-
... has resulted in the out-
ot:Jcvel classification 
30 percent of the current 
and has not 
costs to the state taxpayers 
are enormous. 
California's prison system policy is in crisis because of a massive population 
increase over the past decade. A percentage of these inmates in California 
Department Corrections' (CDC) institutions are inmates 
virtually no in work, education-
al/vocational or drug treatment More than a decade 
the largest building program in world. 
out-of-
current population, and has 
properly. The resulting costs to the 
are enormous. 
The following policy recommendations would enable the CDC to save 
$1.55 billion in capital construction costs, and million 
operating costs by 1996. 
The recommendations would also enable CDC to manage its current inmate 
population better, to predict more accurately construction needs its future 
population the light of current overpopulation and high number of out-of-
level and to fulfill its mission statement - to incarcerate 
California's most serious criminal offenders in a secure, safe and disciplined 
institutional while providing work, academic education, vocational 
training and specialized treatment for the inmate population. 
I. AMEND THE CDC BUILDING PROGRAM TO REFLECT PRISON 
INMATE POPULATION MORE ACCURATELY. 
A, Mandate that the California Department of Corrections house 
inmates in facilities commensurate with their security classification 
level. 
CDC classifies inmates into four security levels via a 
points-based system involving 38 These include 
criminal history, length of sentence, behavior during prior terms, 
escape history and age at of commitment, among things. 
sometimes also uses administrative determinants to 
inmate's points-based score and move 
to a higher security setting. of these administrative 
including such factors as sex problems, to serve, escape 
risk, known enemies and protective needs, are already 
captured by the points-based classification system itself. 
"'"'""'"CDC determinants are neces-
inmates, such subjective determi-
nants can serve as a method to override the objective 
points-based classification often resulting in the inmate's 
a higher security setting, at more expensive construc-
tion and operating costs. 
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Levell inmates, the lowest security level, are housed in open dormi-
tories without a secure perimeter. 
Level D inmates are housed in open dormitories with fenced perime-
ters and armed coverage. 
Level Ill inmates are confined in individual cells with fenced 
perimeters, electronic security and armed coverage. Within some 
Level III facilities are special administrative segregation units 
which are used as short-term placements for Level III behavioral 
problem inmates. 
Level IV inmates, the most recalcitrant or dangerous, are in maxi-
mum security cells with fenced or walled perimeters, including 
electronic security and more staff and armed officers than in a 
Level III facility. Within some Level IV facilities are special hous-
ing units, which represent the highest degree of security for inmates 
whose behavior or security risk cannot be controlled. 
In practice, however, large numbers of low security level inmates 
are placed into cells built for higher security level inmates after the 
CDC has applied administrative determinants to override the 
inmate's points-based classification score. Because the administra-
tive determinant process uses subjective variables to predict security 
risks, it seems to render the objective points-based classification 
process moot. 
At present, nearly 25 percent of inmates occupying Level III cells 
are classified as Levels I and II inmates, who could be housed in less 
expensive facilities. A more accurate projection of bed needs over 
the next five years would require 8,821 more Level I beds, which 
will cost an average of $63,095 per bed to construct, and 781 more 
Level IV beds, which will cost $111,666 per bed, but 1,660 fewer 
Level II beds, which will save $96,500 per bed, and 7,393 fewer 
Level III beds, which will save $110,600 per bed. Such a change in 
the housing policy to reflect a more accurate approach toward 
points-based classification could save the taxpayers $334 million 
(at 1996 per bed costs) in the total construction program by 1996. 
Annual operating costs are affected as well. Since higher security 
level facilities require more intensive staff to inmate ratios, place-
ment appropriate to classification would result in the need for 409 
fewer correctional officers by 1996, for a current annual operating 
cost savings of more than $21.7 million for salary and benefits. 
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B. Make double-ceiling a CDC policy. 
Current policy is to house one inmate in each cell, which the CDC 
calls 100 percent of design bed capacity, despite the fact that nearly all 
Levels III and IV cells now being built contain two concrete bunks. 
Because of the large influx of prisoners, these cells often do accom-
modate two inmates safely. The state should double-cell inmates as 
prison policy. With the Department already placing two inmates 
more than 77 percent of all cells, it is de facto policy for all Levels ill 
and IV inmates, except the most unmanageable. 
The Department's Master Plan calls for construction of 45,280 beds 
(not including those for women) at a cost of more than $4.17 billion by 
1996, while the Assembly Office of Research's (AOR) recommenda-
tions on double-ceiling and classification propose 35,003 beds at a cost 
of slightly more than $2.62 billion, for a savings of $1.55 v•n•vu 
General Fund Capital Outlay. 
C. Adopt a Community Corrections Act which would provide a wide 
range of punishment options at the state and local levels. 
Both the California Legislative Analyst in 1991 and the Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Inmate Population Management 1990 have called 
for the California Legislature to pass a Community Corrections Act. 
Such legislation could reduce the cost of the prison system by placing 
inmates, who otherwise would be housed in expensive state prisons, into 
less costly local facilities. It would expand the use of intermediate 
punishment options as an alt~rnative to state prison. The goal of com-
munity corrections is to provide more effective treatment and services 
primarily to non-violent and substance abuse offenders, thereby reduc-
ing recidivism and lowering state costs. 
The community corrections option would better serve inmates who 
suffer from substance abuse problems, only some of whom are commit-
ted for drug offenses. CDC estimates as many as 80 percent of the prison 
population has substance abuse problems, irrespective of committing 
offense. The Legislative Analyst estimates that in 1991 CDC will spend 
$500 million for those inmates committed for drug offenses alone. 
Although mandated by the California Legislature to create and imple-
ment a comprehensive substance abuse treatment plan for inmates and 
parolees by January 1, 1991, CDC, according to the California Auditor 
General, has not implemented nearly 50 percent of its "plan." 
Legislation should be approved to require CDC to provide comprehen-
sive drug treatment- pursuant to a strategic plan that includes coordi-
nation with community-based programs - for inmates and parolees. 
Such legislation should have clear sanction language that provides for 
CDC budgetary reduction if substance abuse services are not provided. 
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Three measures dealing with community 
duced in 1991-92 Legislative Session. 
sures, as of September 9, 1991 are: 
1. AB 1871 (Burton), Assembly 
2. SB 26 (Lockyer), held in the 
tee; and 
3. SB 18 7 (Presley), held 
Committee. 
were intro-
status of these mea-
and 
D. Create a sentencing reform commission to implementation 
of sentencing guidelines which incorporate the expansion of state and 
local intermediate punishment options. 
Closely related to the community corrections recommendation, sen-
tencing reform would overhaul and conform current sentences to a 
larger variety of punishment options. A Sentencing Reform Commis-
sion, consisting of representatives from all segments of the criminal 
justice system, would make recommendations to the Governor and 
the California Legislature to clarify and simplify the current sentenc-
ing structure, as well as establish sentencing guidelines incorporating 
state and local punishment options. Such sentencing reform would be 
aimed at reducing the numbers of convicted offenders serving time in 
state prison for minor and non-violent offenses. 
Senator Robert Presley is currently developing legislation to create 
a sentencing reform commission. Hearings are scheduled for the 
Fall 1991 interim. 
II. APPEND COST APPROPRIATIONS TO LEGISLATION mAT 
ADDS TO mE PRISON POPULATION. 
During the previous administration's eight years in office ( 1982-1990), 
the Governor signed into law more than 350 pieces oflegislation enhanc-
ing or expanding prison terms or creating new penalties. The Legislative 
Analyst found that more than 4,000 prison beds will be filled in Fiscal 
Year 1991-92 merely as a result of major sentencing legislation chap-
tered between 1985 and 1989. 
The Legislative Analyst also predicts that the cumulative effect of such 
legislation will increase the prison population by approximately 10,000 
inmates by 1994. Until alternate punishment options are created pursu-
ant to a Community Corrections Act (see recommendation I[C] above), 
the California Legislature should not pass legislation which increases 
current sentence lengths, enhances current sentences for particular 
aspects of a crime and upgrades current criminal penalties unless an 
appropriation to pay the added incarceration costs is included within the 
legislation itself. 
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III. AMEND THE CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, WHICH NOW 
DEFINES PURPOSE OF IMPRISONMENT AS PUNISHMENT 
COMMUNITY RE~ 
ENTRY \VORK EDUCATIONAL/VOCA~ 
TIONAL TRAINING AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAMS. 
Currently, California Penal Code Section ll states that "the purpose 
of imprisonment for crime is punishment." CDC's mission statement 
includes a commitment to provide work, academic education, vocational 
training and specialized treatment for inmates. By adopting the proposed 
policy recommendation, California Legislature would conform the 
Penal Code to support CDC's mission statement by providing important 
legislative intent language. The Blue Ribbon Commission on Inmate 
Population Management made a similar recommendation. 
IV. DEVELOP FORMAL STATE\VIDE PAROLE REVOCATION 
CRITERIA TO BE USED BY ALL PAROLE AGENTS WHEN 
DETERMINING WHO SHOULD BE CONTINUED ON PAROLE 
AND WHO SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE BOARD OF PRISON 
TERMS FOR REVIEW. 
Following implementation of the Determinate Sentencing Law in the 
beginning of 1977, the rate of male felon parolees returned to custody 
leapt from percent in 1983 to an all-time high of 69.1 percent in 
1989. However, the criteria which guided the parole agents' revocation 
recommendations during that period has remained essentially the same. 
Thus, an informal policy has guided revocations over the past decade. 
Although CDC released a report in I 990 that called for the streamlining 
of parole revocation criteria, none of the strategies proposed by the 
report have been implemented. Legislation should be approved to man-
date the CDC develop and implement specific statewide parole revoca-
tion criteria. Sanction language should be included in the bill which 
would reduce CDC's parole budget if CDC does not implement such 
criteria pursuant to the legislation. 
V. REQUEST THAT THE CALIFORNIA CONGRESSIONAL DELE-
GATION INTRODUCE LEGISLATION TO REQUIRE THE U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS) AND 
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS EITHER TO PROVIDE 
"FOR THE TRANSFER OF SUCH ALIENS TO APPROPRIATE 
FEDERAL FACILITIES, ORTO PAY FOR THE COST IN CALI-
FORNIA OF INCARCERATING UNDOCUMENTED CRIMINAL 
ALIENS WHO HAVE DEPORTATION ORDERS. 
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As of May 1991, the INS had put a "hold" for eventual deportation on 
more than 9,600 undocumented aliens who are CDC inmates. Thou-
sands more have not as yet been put under hold. CDC officials estimate 
that as many as 20 percent of the current approximately 100,000 inmate 
1. undocumented criminal aliens, 
immediately after to INS custody for placement in an 
INS or federal of Prisons (BOP) facility (or contract 
for the formal deportation proceedings, completion of 
sentence and/or deportation to country of origin. A variation of 
option one enhances current procedures. Undocumented criminal 
aliens are sent to INS holds formal deportation hearings 
within CDC facilities. When final orders of deportation are issued, 
instead the undocumented criminal alien to remain 
CDC custody, or she would be transferred to INS custody for 
placement in an INS or federal BOP facility (or contract facility) for 
the completion of sentence and/or deportation to the country of 
ongm. 
2. The second option is for the government to reimburse the 
California the incarceration undocumented criminal 
aliens with formal orders deportation. 
Either the above-mentioned policy options may combined with a 
cooperative agreement, grounded treaties, between the United States 
and the country ongm, to undocumented criminal alien to 
the country's criminal system to complete the remainder of the 
state imposed sentence. 
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